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1 INTRODUCTION
The wave of restructurings in the electricity supply industry prompted by experience in Britain
and Chile, and in Europe under pressure from a succession of EU Directives, raises new issues
for regulators. The former vertically integrated industry needed regulation of the nal prices
(explicitly, if privately owned, or implicitly, if state owned). Restructuring aimed to create
competing generating companies selling into a wholesale market, with competing retailers buying
to supply their customers. As electricity cannot readily be stored, a system operator is required to
take charge of balancing instantaneous demand and supply and ensuring that the current owing
through the transmission links does not exceed safe limits by calling on generators in di¤erent
locations to adjust their output. Restructuring may result in too few generating companies
located within constrained market areas (which are unable to import alternative generation from
outside the zone because of transmission constraints), raising issues of market power. Finally,
demand and supply vary considerably over the course of a day and season, and both are subject
to sudden shocks, caused by plant or line failures, weather changes and even the half-time break
in a major sporting event.
As a result the wholesale market and the balancing market or mechanism need careful design
to ensure e¢ cient dispatch at acceptable prices. This paper addresses the question of what we
have learned from the analysis of such markets, an active topic in the economics of Industrial
Organization and auction theory, as the traditional models of imperfect competition have proven
unsatisfactory for these very specic features of electricity markets. In contrast to most other
markets, the way price is determined is very well dened in the standard model of a wholesale
electricity market. Each producer submits an o¤er curve that species how much it is willing to
produce at di¤erent prices. Similarly, consumers and retailers (suppliers), who represent small
consumers, submit demand (or bid) curves specifying how much electricity they want to buy at
di¤erent prices. The design of the market can inuence price formation and how competitive the
market will be by choice of the auction format, the level of any price cap, the rationing rule, and
by making restrictions on the o¤er curves. When making their choice regulators should consider
the impact on participantscontracting and investment incentives under various market designs
and rules.
Competition authorities also need to predict electricity prices under various counterfactuals
what might happen if a merger or acquisition is accepted or an interconnector built? Often
authorities are content with using concentration measures, such as the Herndahl-Hirschman
index (HHI), to assess the degree of competition in the market. However, these measures work
poorly for electricity markets, where demand and supply must be instantly balanced and where
the tightness of reserve margins and transmission capacity constraints can vary considerably
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over short periods with signicant impacts on prices (Borenstein et al., 1999, Ofgem, 2000).
Thus given installed production capacities, it depends very much on the level and location of
instantaneous demand whether the market will su¤er from the exercise of market power.
Fortunately, we have made considerable progress in developing a more suitable model -
the supply function equilibrium - to address these questions. This paper qualitatively assesses
the two leading auction formats, the uniform-price and pay-as-bid formats, and other rules of
electricity auctions using supply function equilibria under uncertain demand. We provide new
results highlighting how short-run welfare losses depend on the number of rms in the market
and their asymmetry.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section sets out the structure of
the electricity wholesale market to motivate the justication for the supply function equilibrium
(SFE) model, Section 2 characterises the SFE and surveys the literature. Section 3 draws out
the implications for the analysis of market power, derives expressions for the deadweight cost of
that market power and the e¤ect of forward contracting on both. The section concludes with a
brief summary of the empirical support for the SFE model. Section 4 examines possible market
design remedies and section 5 concludes.
1.1 The wholesale electricity market
Electricity is produced by many di¤erent technologies that often have very di¤erent marginal
costs. The production cost of a plant is primarily determined by fuel costs and its e¢ ciency
that are well-known and common knowledge. The plants of a producer are used in merit order,
starting with the lowest marginal cost, such as nuclear power or hydro-power. Last in the merit-
order are peaking plants, such as open-cycle gas turbines burning natural gas or oil with high
variable and low capital costs. The merit-order implies that producersmarginal costs increase
with output. There are some local deviations from this trend, as start-up costs introduce local
non-convexities, but these are normally neglected in market analyses (though not in optimal
scheduling programmes). Although electricity may be produced by various technologies, it is
still a completely homogeneous good suitable for trading on commodity exchanges and auctions.
In wholesale electricity markets, producers sell electricity to retailers. In their turn, retailers
sell electricity to consumers in the retail market. Electricity consumption is to a large extent
determined exogenously, e.g. by the weather and work-days or holidays, and is very inelastic,
especially close to the time of consumption.1 This limited exibility means that retailersmarket
power is small compared with that of generators, which can be signicant.
1Demand can bid usually into the market, but in Britain the amount in the past was small - 2,000MW compared
to peak demand of over 50,000 MW. Smart metering may change this in future.
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Due to restrictions on the rate that fossil generation can ramp-up output, particularly from a
cold start, production plans are scheduled the day before delivery, and the day-ahead (or prompt
or spot) market is an important component in this planning process. A well-designed liquid
market can provide the strike prices for nancial contracts. The day-ahead market is typically
organized as a double auction to which retailers and producers submit non-increasing bid curves
and non-decreasing o¤er curves, respectively, as shown in gure 1. The market clearing price
(MCP in gure 1) is determined by the intersection of the bids and o¤ers. There is normally a
separate price and auction for each delivery period, typically a half-hour or hour but which can
be as short as 5-15 minutes, even if, as in many markets, the generatorso¤er curves must be
valid for the whole of the next day.
Electricity is special in that supply must equal consumption at every instant, because it
is very expensive to store electrical energy on a large scale. The system operator uses a real-
time or balancing market to make necessary adjustments to production (and consumption to the
extent that it bids into the market) during the delivery period by accepting additional power
production from, or by selling back electricity to, producers. O¤ers to the balancing market are
submitted before the delivery period starts but demand is uncertain when o¤ers are submitted.
System imbalances arise because of unexpected changes in wind and temperature, unexpected
production outages or unexpected transmission-line failures. These are normally handled by the
available incremental and decremental production capacity in the real-time market.
In very extreme cases, this available incremental production capacity may be insu¢ cient to
meet the system imbalance caused by multiple unexpected events, and an outage or loss of load
occurs. The loss-of-load probability (LOLP) is typically very small, but always positive. No mat-
ter how large the reserve margin (available incremental capacity), su¢ ciently many simultaneous
unexpected events that decrease the production or reserve capacity, or increase demand, will lead
to a power shortage. LOLP during any delivery period can be estimated ex ante from the reserve
margin, the probability distribution of demand and from the probabilities of having production
failures in individual plants. Newbery (1998b) shows that the LOLP estimated ex ante by the
system operator in Britain decreases exponentially with the reserve margin. Using data provided
in Newberys paper, and adjusting for the system operators consistent overestimation of LOLP,
we roughly estimate LOLP during an half-hour to 0.1% for a reserve margin of 10% for the
British market from 1990-95, and that it roughly decreased by a factor 100 for every additional
10% of reserve capacity.2 However, these estimates are very uncertain, and only intended to give
2The values are estimated from Fig. 5 in Newbery (1998b) and that capacity payments in the old pool were
proportional to LOLP. It is assumed that the system operator has overestimated the LOLP by a factor of 50. This
very uncertain factor is based on the reasoning in the appendix of Newbery (1998b).
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some feeling for the magnitude of LOLP and its relation to the reserve margin. Normally, the
variance of the demand distribution is small and predictable, with most uncertainty lying on the
supply side.
In the rare situations when electricity demand exceeds market supply, demand has to be
rationed (rst by reducing voltage that cuts demand automatically, then by load shedding) to
avoid a system collapse, and this occurs when the price reaches the price cap. One reason for
price caps is that consumers who do not switch o¤ their equipment when the electricity price
becomes very high do not necessarily have a high marginal benet of power. It may be that
the residential consumer is not at home or not aware of the high price. Moreover, residential
consumers typically do not face the real-time price but buy whatever they want at a contracted
price, and distribution companies do not observe who consumes what in real-time. Such market
or information imperfections make it welfare improving to ration demand at some very high
reservation price, often set equal to the value of lost load (VOLL) (Stoft, 2002). In the English
Electricity Pool, VOLL was set at £ 2,500/MWh in 1990 (5,000 euros/MWh at 2009 prices and
exchange rates). These market/information imperfections may be reduced by installing real-
time (smart) meters combined with time-of-use pricing, and could be completely removed if
the meters could automatically control desired household consumption.
Most electricity wholesale and real-time (or balancing) markets are organized as uniform-
price auctions in which all accepted bids from retailers pay the market clearing price and all
accepted o¤ers from producers are paid the same price. The British balancing market (strictly,
the Balancing Mechanism) is an exception. In this market, all accepted bids and o¤ers pay
or are paid their bid or o¤er. This discriminatory format has also been seriously considered
in other electricity markets, e.g. California (Kahn et al., 2001) and recently also in Italy.3 In
several, mainly European, markets, production is adjusted after market-clearing to ensure that
transmission constraints are not violated within any price zone. This is called counter-trading and
o¤ers accepted in this post-clearing process are paid their o¤er price, not the market clearing
price (MCP) of that price zone, according to a producers individual supply function to the
balancing market.4 Thus many balancing markets are actually a blend of the uniform-price and
3The Italian Law Decree n. 185/2008, better known as the "Anti-Crisis Decree" was converted into law by
January 27, 2009. As a part of the decree, the Ministero per lo Sviluppo Economico in consultation with the
Italian Authority for electricity and gas ("AEEG"), have been instructed to change the trading mechanism on the
Day-Ahead Market (or MGP) from the current system based on a marginal price rule to a new system based
on a pay as bid rule. The change is intended to decrease the average price of electricity traded on the MGP.
4Plant that is constrained-o¤, that is requested not to supply because of excessive local production, is typically
paid its lost prot, equal to the MCP less its o¤er price. E¤ectively, the producer sells accepted power production
at the MCP when the market is cleared but if it turns out that his production is infeasible, he has to buy this
power back at its o¤er price in the post-clearing adjustment.
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the pay-as-bid format. Treasury auctions are similar to electricity auctions in that both are
divisible-good/multi-unit auctions and bidders commit to a bid/o¤er curve in both auctions.
Unlike electricity markets, the pay-as-bid format is used in most treasury auctions. Bartolini
and Cottarelli (1997) nd that 39 out of 42 countries surveyed by them use discriminatory
auctions. But it should be noted that the U.S. treasury gradually switched from a pay-as-bid to
a uniform-price format during 1992-1998 (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002).
Electricity prices are volatile because electricity is not suitable for large-scale storage, short-
run demand is very inelastic and short-run supply can also be inelastic (and in any case the
marginal cost varies substantially depending on the fuel and e¢ ciency of the marginal plant).
To hedge their risks, market participants can buy and sell various derivative contracts, e.g.
futures and forward contracts. These contracts commit the parties to buy and sell the contracted
quantity in the spot or real-time market at the agreed delivery price. In most cases the contracts
are nancial, so no physical transaction takes place. Forward contracts are normally traded over
the counter, and futures contracts on power exchanges.
2 The supply function equilibrium
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) model was originally developed by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) and rst applied to the electricity market by Green and Newbery (1992) and Bolle (1992).
It is a game-theoretic model of competition in wholesale electricity markets. It assumes that each
producer chooses its o¤er curve in order to maximize its prot, given demand and o¤er curves
chosen by competitors. In concentrated markets, producers may be able to tacitly collude to
higher electricity prices, as Sweeting (2007) suggests happened in Britain, but this e¤ect is only
briey considered below. The SFE is a static equilibrium, i.e. it is assumed that all producers
will play their prot-maximizing strategies repeatedly, irrespective of what happened in previous
periods. In practice it may take a while before each producer has gured out its best o¤er
strategy given the residual demand it faces. This learning is facilitated in markets that disclose
individual or aggregated o¤er curves to the auction, such as the Amsterdam Power Exchange
(APX), illustrated in gure 1. This gure shows the determination of the market clearing price
(MCP) for hour 12 on 26 June 2007, illustrating a part of the ladders of o¤ers and bids and
showing that 1,942.4 MW was traded at a MCP of 58.83 Euros/MWh.5
The setting of the SFE assumes that production costs are common knowledge and that
5Typical capacity connected to the Dutch system would be over 15,000 MW and the APX covers a wider
area than just the Netherlands, so a relatively small fraction of capacity is traded on the APX. Note that price
responsiveness on the demand side is mainly provided by producers who bid to buy back electricity that they have
sold in the forward market.
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Figure 1: Market clearing price detail from APX Hour 12, 26 June 2007
demand is uncertain or time-varying. This is a good description of electricity markets, where
technology characteristics and fuel prices are transparent and producers make o¤ers before de-
mand has been realised. They further assume that the shock " is additive to the demand schedule,
so that D(p; ") = D(p) + ", and production uncertainties are neglected for strategic producers.
This considerably simplies the determination of the residual demand schedule of a producer i,
for which shocks will again be additively separable, Ri = Ri(p)+". These assumptions make the
SFE model tractable in comparison with multi-unit/divisible good auction models with common
or a¢ liated uncertain values/costs by Wilson (1979) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002), which
are often used to analyze treasury auctions. For example, SFE can be determined analytically for
cases with constant marginal costs (Newbery, 1998; Holmberg, 2007) and linear marginal costs
with linear demand (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green, 1996; Baldick et al., 2004; Newbery,
2008b).6 Closed form solutions are also available for symmetric rms and perfectly inelastic
demand (Rudkevich et al, 1998; Anderson and Philpott, 2002a). Numerical algorithms make it
possible to calculate SFE of markets with asymmetric rms and general cost functions (Anderson
and Hu, 2008a; Aromí, 2007; Edin, 2007; Holmberg, 2009a).
The equations originally derived by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) can be explained in the
6There are linear SFE for the case of linear marginal costs, and analytic non-linear solutions have been derived
by Newbery (2008b).
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following intuitive way. Even if the demand shock is unknown ex ante a producer can still
construct an o¤er curve that leads to an ex post optimal prot for each shock outcome. In a
pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game, competitorso¤er strategies are known, so
that for each shock outcome a producer knows its residual demand. Thus it can calculate the
optimal mark-up for each outcome by applying the monopoly mark-up rule or Ramsey pricing
to the elasticity of its residual demand (dened to be a positive number) resi (Tirole, 1988):
p  C 0 (qi (p))
p
=
1
resi
: (1)
The elasticity of residual demand is straightforward to calculate as long as there are no binding
transmission constraints in the power system. With binding constraints, changing an o¤er in
one node will inuence the power ows in the system in a non-trivial way, but it is still possible
with suitable software to derive the transmission-constrained elasticity of residual demand (Xu
and Baldick, 2007). Figure 2 shows that the optimal output for each demand outcome is chosen
so that the marginal revenue (MR) equals the marginal cost (MC). This gives a point in the
producers optimal o¤er curve. By repeating the procedure for each shock outcome ", the optimal
o¤er curve can be derived. The same approach works where demand is certain but time varying
and o¤ers must be valid for each time period (48 half-hours in Britain), provided that the time
dependence is separable so that D(p; t) = D(p) + f(t). For the tractable case of linear demand
this would have D(p; t) = a  t  bp, 0  t  1.
Each producer calculates its o¤er curve in a similar way and the system is in equilibrium
when each producer is satised that its o¤er schedule is optimal given the behaviour of all
other suppliers. Equilibrium is then calculated from a system of equations as in (1). The
equations are di¤erential equations as the optimal mark-up of one producer depends on the slope
of competitors o¤er curves. The second-order condition for prot maximizing o¤er curves in
uniform-price auctions is that the marginal cost should increase faster than the marginal revenue
at each extremum point, which is the case in gure 2. Holmberg et al. (2008) show that the
second-order condition is satised for all sets of increasing o¤er curves satisfying (1) if demand
is weakly concave (which includes linear demand).
Without an initial condition or end-condition there is generally a continuum of equilibria
bounded by the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Figure 3 shows the range of possible equilibria
estimated by Green and Newbery (1992) for two possible market structures in the English Elec-
tricity Pool. The Cournot line is the optimal o¤er if all other producers o¤er a xed supply - as
would be the case if competitorscapacity constraints are binding in the high demand state, that
is, his supply is required to balance demand and supply then. The wide range of equilibria can be
explained in the following way. Assume for simplicity that marginal costs are constant. Now if
competitorschoose to play Bertrand strategies, i.e. o¤ers are perfectly elastic, then the residual
8
Figure 2: The SF is the best response to all residual demands
Figure 3: Estimated SFE for England and Wales, 1990.
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Figure 4: The e¤ect of capacity and number of competitors on the SF
demand of producer becomes perfectly elastic and the best response is, according to (1), to have
zero mark-ups, so that the best o¤er is a Bertrand o¤er. If competitorso¤ers are less elastic
then the best response will have increasing mark-ups, so the optimal o¤er is also less elastic. But
the range of equilibria shrinks as the maximum demand shock increases and with possible innite
demand shocks a unique equilibrium can be found (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). For bounded
demand shocks, the range of equilibria is constrained by capacity (Green and Newbery, 1992;
Baldick and Hogan, 2002; Anderson and Hu, 2008a). Genc and Reynolds (2004) analyse in detail
how pivotal producers reduce the range of equilibria. In particular, a unique equilibrium will be
singled out if maximum demand is high enough to make the capacity constraints of all (but pos-
sibly one) rms bind with a positive probability, which could be arbitrarily small (Aromí, 2007;
Holmberg, 2007; Holmberg, 2008a). If demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, the unique equilibrium is
selected by the price cap and the capacity constraint. Figure 4, taken from Holmberg (2008a),
illustrates this for the case of perfectly inelastic demand. We see that the market price is near
marginal cost for low demand outcomes and near the price cap for high demand outcomes.
To avoid discontinuities in its optimal o¤er curve, each producer needs to face a smooth
residual demand curve. If demand is su¢ ciently elastic so that the price cap never binds for the
optimal o¤er curves, then the unique symmetric equilibrium for a positive loss of load probability
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Figure 5: Uniqueness determined by the SF becoming vertical at full capacity
(LOLP) is given by the symmetric solution where the slope of the supply curve becomes vertical
at the capacity constraint, i.e. supply curves touch the Cournot line at that point. This ensures
that all producers have a smooth residual demand at the capacity constraint and corresponds to
the upper supply schedule in Green and Newbery (1992). Note that maximum demand schedule
need not cross the smooth o¤er curve implied by the rstorder condition in (1), because at the
capacity constraint this curve can be extended vertically up to the price cap without any kinks,
as shown in gure 5, with the price then on the demand curve (in this case at the cap).
2.1 Generalisations of the supply function equilibrium
The SFE model developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) relied on ex post optimality, i.e. a
producer could choose its optimal supply function (SF) such that its prot was maximized for
each shock outcome. This may not always be possible, if producers choose the best expected
outcome before knowing the shock, but would like to have chosen a di¤erent o¤er curve once
they know the actual shock. Thus Wilson (2008) analyses SFE in a transmission network with
multiple nodes, where each node has an individual demand shock. When the shocks are multi-
dimensional, it is generally not possible to nd an ex post optimal SF. Wilson was nevertheless
able to derive rst-order conditions for the ex ante optimal choices and hence characterise an
equilibrium for a general transmission network. The equations are quite complicated, as they
depend on the probability distributions of the demand shocks.
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Anderson and Philpott (2002b) characterize the residual demand by its market distribution
function, which implicitly determines the contour of the residual demand curve for each probabil-
ity level. This general formulation allows for equilibria that are ex ante, but not ex post, optimal
and residual demands that are not restricted to the linear shifts of the SFE model. Analogously,
one can introduce o¤er distribution functions, which implicitly determine the contour of each
producers o¤er curve for each probability level, to analyse mixed strategy equilibria in electricity
auctions and other multi-unit auctions (Anderson et al., 2009).
3 The determinants of market power
One of the key questions in restructuring the industry is whether the resulting structure will be
workably competitive, and to that extent not to need additional regulation. Similar questions
arise if a merger is proposed, or whether a proposed demerger will be su¢ cient to satisfy a
regulator concerned with market power (as with the 1994 British Pool Inquiry that resulted in
the divestiture of 6,000 MW of plant from National Power and Powergen - see O¤er, 1994, 1995).
For that we need models that relate the price-cost mark-up to the industry structure and demand
characteristics. Newbery (1998) analytically solves for the SFE for two symmetric duopolies with
constant marginal costs c, linear demand D(p) = a   bp, and additive shocks or time varying
demand (a varies with t). In the appendix, this solution is generalised to N > 2 symmetric rms
with market capacity Q to given an implicit equation for the price-cost mark-up p cc :
x =
Q
Q
=
N
(N   2)
p  c
c
 
(N   1)

1
N
c
p  c
(N 2)=(N 1)
  1
!
; (2)
where x = Q=Q is the load factor (output as a fraction of total capacity) and  = cb=Q is the
elasticity of demand at the e¢ cient price c (i.e. the marginal cost) when the demand shock "
(or the time varying value of a) is such that the linear demand at this price equals the market
capacity. The relation is based on the upper supply schedule, so it is a worst case (highest
price) scenario. If the price cap is su¢ ciently low, so that it binds, the market will have a more
competitive unique equilibrium.
We can use (2) to prove that it is benecial for competition to connect two symmetric
markets. This will double the capacity, demand, including its slope, and the number of producers
in the integrated market. Hence the dimension-less constant  = cb=Q is the same in the
integrated market as for the separate markets, but N has doubled. Thus mark-ups, p cc ; will
be reduced for every load factor x.7 But if instead the same rms operate on the two separate
markets, market integration neither inuences N nor mark-ups as a function of the load factor.
7This is not immediate but is established in the appendix.
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Figure 6: Mark-ups and resulting deadweight loss (DWL).
Hence, large cross-elasticities for consumption in adjacent delivery periods (e.g. if load can switch
from high price to a following low price period) will not make bidding more competitive if the
demand curves (and hence realised prices) in the two periods are identical.
As illustrated in gure 6, the mark-up results in under-production, which gives a deadweight
loss, DWL. In the appendix we relate the mark-up p cc to the relative DWL (i.e. expressed as a
fraction of the short-run industry prots) !; so that (2) can be written as follows:
x = 2N(N   1)N 1 !
(N(1 + 2!)  2)N 1 : (3)
We note that the relative DWL ! is independent of the demand elasticity, ; for constant marginal
costs, although of course prots will depend on . It should also be noted that the expression
is not valid when the capacity constraint binds for the welfare maximizing output, so that
the welfare loss triangle is truncated by the capacity constraint. When output equals market
capacity there are no welfare losses even if there are mark-ups in the market. Because of the
truncation, the relation between welfare losses and mark-ups will be more complicated near the
capacity constraint. We use numerically calculated symmetric SFE to consider this e¤ect. In
the numerical simulations we also consider increasing and more realistic marginal costs, when
the relative deadweight losses depend on the demand elasticity. In these calculations we use
production costs of the English Pool in 1988/89 (Green and Newbery, 1992). In gure 7 the
relation in (3) is plotted as a function of the load factor for 5 and 10 rms comparing the
constant cost case with those estimated for the English Pool. The short-run demand elasticity of
13
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
x - load factor
D
W
L
/p
ro
fit
s
N =10, Constant MC
N =5, Constant MC
N =5, b =0.5, E & W
N =10, b =0.1, E & W
N =10, b =0.5, E & W
N =5, b =0.1, E & W
Figure 7: Dependence of deadweight loss (DWL) on load factor and number of rms (N).
electricity markets have been estimated to be in the range 0:05 to 0:4.8 Thus the results for the
English Pool have been calculated for a wide interval: b = 0:1 and b = 0:5 correspond to  = 0:08
and  = 0:4: We see that typically the relative DWL is increasing with the load factor. The
reason is that the mark-up is normally convex in output. This convexity is less pronounced for
increasing marginal costs (which makes supply functions steeper) and more elastic demand, when
the slope of competitorssupply functions has relatively less inuence on mark-ups in comparison
to the slope of the exogenous demand, and the relative DWL curve is atter in that case. In
the cases studied here, ve symmetric rms are enough to keep relative DWL below 1% if the
load factor is below 50%. This corresponds to a Herndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of 2000.9
Ten symmetric rms (HHI = 1000) are enough to keep relative DWL below 1%. Note that the
graphs for constant marginal costs are calculated from (3), which disregards that welfare losses
are truncated near the capacity constraint.
8von der Fehr et al (2005) estimate the consumer demand elasticity at 0.3 from the high price episode in Norway
following hydro shortages, while Patrick and Wolak (1997) cite Borenstein and Bushnells (1997) estimates from
California of 0.1-0.4, and estimate the short-run demand elasticity by the water industry in England as 0.05-0.27
(depending on the time of day and hence price level). Other individual industries had lower elasticities.
9The HHI is dened as the sum of the squared percentages of market shares, so 10 rms with 10% each would
have an HHI of 10x100=1000. See Tirole (1988) for more details.
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In practice it is the average DWL that matters. Considering the load duration curve for the
market in England and Wales, Green and Newbery (1992) estimate the average DWL relative to
average short-run prots to 1.3% for ve symmetric producers and  = 0:2:With two producers,
and otherwise unchanged market conditions, the average DWL relative to average prots is
signicantly higher, 8:5%   9:8% (depending on the slope of the demand curve). Green and
Newbery (1992) also calibrate their model to consider di¤erent entry scenarios in 1994. All
entry is with high-e¢ cient combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), while the oligopoly is mostly
unchanged for the more costly and price-setting coal-red stations, although incumbents replace
some of these stations by CCGT. With ve symmetric producers, the market is su¢ ciently
competitive to discourage entry. However, they estimate that there will be signicant entry for
a duopoly market with  = 0:2. Even if the duopoly of the price-setting units is by and large
una¤ected by the entry, the output of these units is reduced, so that market shares for the two
incumbents reduce to 26% each. This also reduces the strategic mark-ups and the average DWL
relative to average prots is reduced to 4.9%. Green and Newbery (1992) show that duopoly
with entry results in lower concentration and lower average DWL relative to average prots when
producers o¤er below the upper supply schedule.
With asymmetric rms the equilibrium is calculated from a system of equations as in (1).
As in the symmetric case a unique equilibrium is singled out if maximum demand is high enough
to make the capacity constraints of all (but possibly one) rms bind. To model strategic bidding
of 153 hydro-producers in Norway, Holmberg (2007) assumed constant marginal costs and asym-
metric capacities. The result is that small rms with less capacity and less market-power o¤er
their capacity with lower mark-ups compared to large rms. This implies that the capacity of
small rms will bind at lower prices compared to large rms. Hence, many rms in the market
compete for the marginal o¤er at low prices, but the number of competing rms decreases as
the price increases. Thus the asymmetric market is more competitive for low demand shocks
compared to a symmetric market with a similar market concentration index (HHI index), but
less competitive for high demand shocks (see gure 8).
In a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of a market with symmetric producers, production
is always e¢ cient for a given total output, so that the total production cost of the market is
minimized. This is also true for an asymmetric market with identical constant marginal costs.
This is not true if mark-ups are asymmetric and marginal costs are increasing, because then there
will be circumstances when costly production from a low mark-up producer will be accepted
instead of less costly production from a high mark-up producer. Figure 9 shows an asymmetric
SFE for ve uncontracted strategic producers in the England and Wales market during 1999.
The costs of the strategic producers were approximated by quadratic cost functions as described
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Figure 8: Unique SFE of Norwegian real-time market compared with 8-rm symmetric SFE
(Logarithmic price scale)
in Green (1996) and Baldick et al. (2004). The nuclear power producers, BNFL and British
Energy, were assumed to be non-strategic and the o¤ers of their must-run plants were assumed
to be inframarginal. The equilibrium was originally calculated by Anderson and Hu (2008a) and
is replicated using an alternative numerical method by Holmberg (2009a). The market shares
and market concentration index depend on the price; HHI varies in the range 2000-5000. To
illustrate the production ine¢ ciency we have highlighted the marginal costs of each producer at
the price £ 30/MWh in Fig. 9.
We use the asymmetric SFE to calculate welfare loss relative to prots. The results are
presented in Figure 10. We see that the calculated welfare loss relative to prots due to ine¢ cient
production is largest around the output 4 GW (4,000 MW) of the strategic producers. At this
point National Power and PowerGen have signicantly larger output and mark-ups compared to
AES, Eastern and Edison Mission Energy that start production at a higher marginal cost. Apart
from the peak at 4% the production ine¢ ciency is fairly stable around 2% in the mid-range of
the output. It is smaller for low and high outputs. Figure 10 also shows that the dead-weight
loss caused by under-production is U-shaped. The curve is very steep for high outputs when the
capacity constraints of AES and Edison Mission Energy starts to bind. The high relative dead-
weight loss for low outputs can be explained by only National Power and PowerGen competing
in the market for low outputs, which gives relatively high mark-ups. Moreover, as competition
is increasing for higher outputs, the o¤er curves of National Power and Power Gen are locally
concave for small outputs, see gure 9, which gives the relative welfare loss a decreasing shape.
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In the asymmetric market with ve strategic rms, all producers have similar production
costs and capacities. Even so, the DWL due to ine¢ cient production is of the same order
of magnitude as the DWL due to underproduction. Thus one would expect the production
ine¢ ciencies to dominate if the asymmetry is larger, especially if the smallest rms, who have
the lowest mark-ups, have a relatively large fraction of the stations with high production costs.
3.1 Forward contracting
It is well-known that forward sales mitigate the market power of electricity producers. This has
been shown both empirically (Wolak, 2000; Bushnell et al., 2008) and theoretically (von der Fehr
and Harbord, 1992; Newbery, 1998a; Green, 1999a). Chao and Wilson (2005) show that the
mitigation can be even more successful with option contracts. Given the large potential market
power that a low demand elasticity and concentrated market structures confer on incumbents
in real-time, contracts are potentially very important. As generators in the worlds restructured
electricity markets tend to sell a large fraction of their output in the contract market (Green,
1999a; Bushnell, 2007) the e¤ect in reducing deadweight loss is very welcome. But high contract
cover is not true for all markets. For example, one of the alleged reasons for the failure of the
California Power Exchange was the very limited use of forward contracting by market participants
and a high reliance on spot market trading (Bushnell, 2004).
Mark-ups in the real-time market only inuence the revenue from sales net of forward con-
tracting. Hence, it is the residual demand net of forward contracts that are relevant for a prot
maximizing producer. It is immediate to show (e.g. Anderson and Hu, 2008c; Holmberg, 2008b)
that a producers optimal supply curve is given by the natural generalisation of equation (1):
p  C 0 (qi (p))
p
=
1
net resi
:
where qi is the producers total output including forward sales and net resi is the elasticity of its
residual net-demand. As before, a producer o¤ers positive net-supply with positive mark-ups in
the real-time market. If a producer has negative net-supply, i.e. it has to buy back electricity in
the real-time market, then it will use its market-power to push down the price. Hence, mark-ups
are negative for negative net-supply. Mark-ups are zero at the contracting point where net-supply
is zero. These statements are formally proven by Newbery (1995, 1998a) and Anderson & Hu
(2008c) and used to identify contract positions by Hortacsu and Puller (2008). Figure 11 shows
qualitatively how the equilibrium in gure 4 is changed by forward contracting.
We note that adjusting contract cover closer to the expected output reduces mark-ups at
that point, as mark-ups at the contracting point are zero. Hence, mark-ups would be small if all
producers were almost fully contracted. To analyse the e¤ect of the forward contracts, we revisit
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Figure 11: Mark-ups are positive for outputs greater that contracts and negative for outputs less
than contracts.
the calculations in gure 7, but in gure 12 we now assume that half of the expected output
is sold in the forward market.10 Again it should be noted that the calculations for constant
marginal costs are based on (3), which disregards that welfare losses are truncated near the
capacity constraint.
Comparing 7 and gure 12 we see that the welfare losses are reduced by a factor 4-10 when
half the expected output is sold in the forward market. The reduction of the welfare losses is
likely to be even larger for most real electricity markets, where the contract cover is more like
80-100% (Green, 1999a; Sweeting, 2007). Hence, with signicant forward contracting, su¢ cient
competition in electricity markets can be maintained with only a few number of rms.
Obviously high contract cover reduces producersmarket-power, so why do they sell in the
forward market and how can market regulators stimulate such sales? One way is for regulators to
mandate a su¢ cient volume of forward sales. According to Bushnell (2007) this is an important
factor when explaining forward sales in many U.S. markets. This is becoming more common
in Europe as well. For example, the European Commission has recently conditioned proposed
mergers on that the merged electricity producers have to sell parts of their capacity in virtual
10Note that the amount of contracting is assumed to change for each delivery period, so that it is proportional
to the expected output for every period. Thus a new SFE is calculated for each expected output level. The
standard deviation in the demand is assumed to be small for each expected output level so that the forward price
approximately equals the spot price for the expected output level.
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Figure 12: Dependence of deadweight loss (DWL) on load factor and number of rms (N).
power plant auctions. This temporary divestiture is equivalent to the sale of a package of forward
contracts (Ofgem, 2009). It can also be in producersown interest to sell in the forward market
if they are risk-averse.
Forward contracting can also be driven by arbitrage opportunities. The risk in the electric-
ity market is mainly non-systematic, i.e. the correlation between electricity prices and the stock
market as a whole is weak. Hence, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) would predict that
the risk premium for risks carried in the electricity market would be small, because speculators
can, at least in theory, completely eliminate non-systematic risks by holding a well-diversied
portfolio (Hull, 1997). However, many empirical studies suggest that risk premia can be sig-
nicant in electricity markets as in Longsta¤s and Wangs (2004) study of the PJM market
(U.S.). Kristiansen (2007) reaches a similar conclusion for Nord Pool, the electricity market of
the Nordic countries. Anderson and Hu (2008b) use an SFE model to show that such a risk pre-
mium can arise when strategic retailers prefer to buy in the forward market in order to increase
producers forward sales, which lowers their mark-ups in the real-time market. Similarly, such a
risk-premium can occur if consumers have to buy in the forward market, e.g. due to penalties
on real-time imbalances. Green (1999b) motivates the risk premium by noting that retailers
have thinner margins and so are more risk-averse than producers. Given that much trading is
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bilateral and not marked to market as in futures markets, the risks of bankruptcy are very real
for retailers (and have certainly occurred in Britain, Texas and California) when there are sudden
very large wholesale price movements, so retailer risk aversion is understandable.
But forward contracting in markets with imperfect competition is also driven by strategic
mechanisms. Newbery (1998a) shows that producers may use contract sales to keep output
high and spot prices low to deter entry. The risk of keeping prices high is that entrants will be
attracted by the observation that the incumbents are able and willing to maintain protability,
but once they enter their capacity will remain to suppress prices for the next 20-40 years. Indeed,
high prices encouraged a dash for gasand excess entry into the English market in the 1990s,
and the incumbents appeared to have tacitly colluded to maintain prices while selling o¤ plant,
only for those prices to fall dramatically as the new owners, with smaller market shares, o¤ered
more aggressively and caused prices to collapse in 2000-01. Equilibrium in this oligopoly with
free entry will be one in which the average price is equal to the long-run marginal cost (which
includes the cost of investment) but the price is above the short-run marginal cost (SRMC), thus
producing the short-run prots to cover the xed costs.
Financial trading is anonymous in most power markets, and a rms forward and futures
positions are not revealed to competitors. Still, producers may be able to make rough estimates
of changes in competitorstotal futures positions by analysing changes in the turn-over in the
forward market and the forward price. That competitors can deduce this information gives
producers another strategic incentive, which was rst illustrated by Allaz and Vila (1993). In
their two-stage Cournot model, producers use forward contracts as a rst-mover device. By
selling to consumers in the forward market, a producer can shift consumers real-time demand
(net of forward contracts) inwards. If competitors observe or infer what is happening they would
respond by shifting their optimal output inwards. For xed contracting levels of competitors, this
makes it possible for a producer to increase its market share and prot at competitors expense
by selling in the forward market. However, all producers have the opportunity to sell in the
forward market and they all have incentives to do so. Hence, instead of increased market-shares,
strategic contracting just leads to more competitive bidding and lower prots for producers,
which is good for welfare but bad for producers. In the limit as rms recontract (assuming they
can observe earlier contract positions) the market becomes perfectly competitive. Actual markets
have something between 3-8 rounds of contracting (as measured by the churn rate, Ofgem, 2009)
but most of these subsequent rounds are between traders, retailers or generators adjusting their
positions at the margin and do not amount to additional contracts modelled by Allaz and Vila.
Allaz and Vilas result appears attractive for the designers of electricity markets. Unfor-
tunately the results are not robust to alternative specications of competition. Murphy and
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Smeers (2005) show in a multi-stage Cournot model that if capacity is chosen knowing that in
the subsequent periods contracting will make competition more intense and prots lower, rms
will invest less in order to keep capacity tight and prices higher in compensation, just as Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983) showed that intense price (Bertrand) competition in the post invest-
ment period would lead to Cournot choices of capacity that would constrain output and support
Cournot equilibria. Mahenc and Salanié (2004) show that strategic forward trading can have
an anti-competitive e¤ect if contracts are observable and producers compete in prices rather
than quantities. The reason is that with Bertrand competition, competitors respond by reducing
mark-ups if a producer commits to low mark-ups by making large forward sales. To avoid the ag-
gressive response producers have incentives to buy in the forward market (negative contracting),
which will push up mark-ups. While such squeezes are theoretically possible they are unusual
(perhaps because they attract the attention of regulators).
Unlike the Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium, the SFE is ex post optimal to a range of
additive demand shocks. A linear shift of the net-demand curve in the real-time market, due to
increased forward sales, has no inuence on competitorsoptimal o¤ers. To inuence competitors
bidding in this model, the slopes of competitors residual net-demand curves have to change.
Moreover, they have to be able to predict these changes from observed changes in forward
sales. Holmberg (2008b) shows that a strategic producer will use the forward market in order
to commit itself to less elastic net-o¤er curves in the real-time market. This makes competitors
residual demand less elastic and their mark-ups will increase in accordance with (1). Thus
competitors output curves shift inwards, and the strategic producer can increase its market-
share on their expense. Whether such a commitment of a strategic producer results from more
contracting, which is pro-competitive, or less contracting, which is anti-competitive, depends on
the curvature of the marginal cost and residual demand curves (Holmberg, 2008b). When the
producer increases its forward sales, the marginal cost curve as a function of the net-supply (net
of forward contracts) will shift inwards, and so will the net-supply curve. The inward shift of
the net-supply curve is largest at points where the marginal cost curve is steep (as illustrated in
gure 13) and at points where the mark-up is small. Hence, if marginal costs are convex and the
residual demand is concave, selling in the forward market will shift the o¤er curve more inwards
at high prices compared to low prices. This will make the producers net-supply curve less elastic
for all prices and competitorsoptimal net-supply curves will become less competitive as well.
However, the result is the opposite for concave marginal costs and convex residual demand,
provided the producers capacity is non-binding (pro-competitive e¤ects cannot be ruled out for
all prices if production capacities are binding). If both marginal costs and residual demand are
linear (which requires that rms o¤er linear SFs as in the linear SFE model by Green, 1999a)
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Figure 13: E¤ect of an increase in forward sales for strictly convex marginal costs
and the market capacity is non-binding, then strategies are neutral; competitorsobservations
of changes in a producers forward sales do not inuence competitorsbidding in the real-time
market. Empirically, marginal costs and o¤er curves are typically convex. Convex o¤er curves
result in convex residual demand if demand is convex or su¢ ciently inelastic. Hence, the Allaz
and Vila e¤ect is non-robust in electricity markets. Moreover, it is uncertain how strong this
e¤ect is as competitorsforward positions are not directly observable.
At the margin, increased forward sales of a producer can also result in a lower forward
price and less forward sales for competitors (rather than increased consumer contracting). Green
(1999a) and Holmberg (2008b) show that this makes competitorsbidding less competitive. This
mechanism gives a producer incentives to increase its own forward sales, so that its output can
be increased at competitors expense. But for given strategies of competitors, any producer has
similar incentives. Hence, in equilibrium all producers will increase their forward sales, which
makes the market more competitive. The pro-competitive e¤ect increases with liquidity provided
by competitors in the forward market. As competitors can always observe their own contracting
level, observability is not an issue in this case.
3.2 Empirical results
The SFE model can be tested qualitatively and quantitatively against observed bidding behav-
iour. With many rms in the market, the SFE model predicts that electricity prices are near the
marginal cost until the capacity constraint binds, where there is a steep increase in the price (see
gure 4). This phenomenon is called hockey-stick bidding, which has been observed in U.S.
markets (Hurlbut et al., 2004). Figure 14 shows the same e¤ect observed on a European power
exchange, where the price-cost mark-up only becomes appreciable as the available supply falls
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Figure 14: Price-cost mark-up observed on a European power exchange
to less than 110% of the estimated demand (so that the reserve margin falls below 10%).11
The SFE model also has empirical support in that two empirical studies of ERCOT (a
balancing market in Texas) suggest that the o¤ers of the two to three largest rms do indeed
match the rst-order condition of the continuous SFE (Hortacsu and Puller, 2008; Sioshansi and
Oren, 2007). Niu et al. (2005) are also able to replicate observed market prices in this market
using a model with linear SFE and xed forward contracting. Willems et al. (2009) are able
to replicate mark-ups in the German electricity market by using a SFE model with calibrated
contracting cover. They also nd a similar t for a Cournot model if they allow for a higher
contracting level.
There are other empirical approaches that test the underlying assumptions of the SFE model.
Wolak (2003a) backs out the unobserved underlying cost and contract positions of generators
bidding into the Australian market. He cannot reject the hypothesis that producers use pure
and static strategies to maximize their expected prot with respect to an uncertain smoothed
residual demand. Hence, his results indirectly support the SFE model.
The SFE is a static model and may not be a suitable model for predicting behaviour in
markets where prices are driven by tacit collusion, although it can be used to test whether tacit
collusion is occurring. Sweeting (2007) makes the assumption that producers contract cover
11The EU Sector Inquiry gives many excellent examples of similar scatter diagrams, see London Economics
(2007).
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is 80% (or larger) and is able to characterize the various phases of market evolution and the
exercise of market power in the English Electricity Pool. He concludes that the behaviour of the
two largest generators was consistent with either tacit collusion or an attempt to raise the Pool
prices, so that they could negotiate higher forward prices and sale prices of the plants they were
divesting.
The SFE is primarily used to predict bidding behaviour, but the rst-order conditions can
also be used to back-out mark-ups from observed o¤er curves.Wolak (2003b) uses observed in-
dividual bid and o¤er curves to calculate the elasticity of the residual demand for ve large
producers in the California market. From these results he can estimate potential mark-ups using
(1). On average the potential mark-ups were 15% in 2000, which was 3-5 times higher than in
1998 and 1999.
4 Regulation of electricity markets
4.1 Should o¤er curves be disclosed?
Some markets, e.g. in Britain,12 New Zealand and Australia, disclose individual o¤er curves
with some time delay. In this case, it is easy to calculate the residual demand elasticity of each
producer at the clearing point as in Wolak (2003b). This greatly simplies market surveillance
for market regulators and competition authorities, as no information about production costs is
needed to calculate potential mark-ups. The advantages are especially large for markets where
production costs or opportunity costs are particularly di¢ cult to estimate for outsiders, which is
the case in hydro-dominated markets where opportunity costs are determined by the producers
prognoses of future inows to the reservoirs and future electricity prices. A disadvantage with
disclosing o¤er curves is that producers can use the disclosed individual o¤er curves to monitor
competitors signals and how well they follow an implicit or explicit collusive strategy. But
this risk is reduced if only parts of the o¤er curves around the clearing point are disclosed,
which provides su¢ cient information for the approach by Wolak (2003b), and if disclosure is
signicantly delayed, perhaps up to one year. The obvious solution is for individual o¤ers/bids
to be immediately made available to the regulator, but not the market, at least without a suitable
delay.
Some markets (e.g. APX in gure 1) disclose aggregated supply and demand curves. This
makes it possible for producers, who know their own o¤er curves, to exactly calculate their
residual demand, so that they can monitor their competitorsaggregate o¤ers. But this type
12 In the Pool until it was abolished by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements in 2001, and thereafter in the
Balancing Mechanism.
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of disclosure does not give regulators the same possibility for market surveillance. Unless the
disclosure of aggregated o¤ers/bids are delayed by a long time, it seems that it facilitates tacit
collusion without improving regulatorsmonitoring possibilities.
4.2 The price cap and investment
Most of the analysis so far has focused on short-run e¤ects for given production capacities. But
in the long-run investors need to recover their xed costs in order to invest. The variation
of demand over the day and annually means that systems with an optimal mix of production
technologies will have low variable cost base-load plant, higher cost mid-merit plant, and peaking
plant that has low capital costs but high variable costs. In a perfectly competitive market with
zero mark-ups, base-load and mid-merit will still recover some of their xed costs during peak
demand periods where the price is set by peaking plants. But peaking plants always require
some mark-ups to recover their marginal costs. Section 3 demonstrates that these mark-ups
should only occur at maximum capacity if short-run social welfare losses are to be avoided. This
is the case in perfectly competitive markets when peaking power plants cover their xed costs
during the rare events when there is an electricity shortage, so that the market is cleared at the
price cap. For similar reasons the transmission charges in Britain are collected from consumers
in the three peak half-hours (separated by ten days), e¢ ciently collecting those xed costs at
the peak. Stoft (2002) demonstrates that risk-neutral producers will have the right investment
incentives in perfectly competitive markets when the price cap is set equal to the Value of Lost
Load (VOLL). But in an oligopoly with market power the xed costs are not collected only at
the peak, but over the whole range of outputs, and as demonstrated in Section 3 such mark-ups
results in welfare losses.
An advantage with the regulation where peaking plants can recover their xed costs because
of a high price cap is that producers always want to o¤er all of their available production capacity
to the market, because it is always better to o¤er capacity at the price cap than to withhold
it, at least in a static equilibrium (Holmberg, 2008a). To perfectly hedge against uncertainties
in their residual demand, producers can issue call options (or equivalently one-way contracts for
di¤erences) for each production unit with a quantity and strike price corresponding to the units
capacity and marginal cost (Chao and Wilson, 2005). As suggested by Oren (2005), a market
for call options is a natural way of implicitly introducing capacity payments (discussed below).
Some markets in Latin America have replaced the high price cap with explicit capacity
payments and a lower price cap, pcap. To get optimal investments in a competitive market,
the administratively determined capacity payment should equal LOLP (VOLL  pcap), which
ensures that producers in competitive markets are paid the same amount on average as in markets
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Figure 15: Reducing the price cap pushes down the equilibrium price for every demand outcome.
without capacity payments and the price cap equal to VOLL. (The former British pool had an
implicitly determined capacity payment in which generators were paid LOLP(VOLL-SMP)
where SMP was the system marginal price, with much the same e¤ect). Capacity payments are
determined on the basis of LOLP for every period, and although they will normally be very low,
for some hours they can be very high when reserve margins are below a critical level. Capacity
payments are independent of the bids (but increase exponentially as the reserve margin falls),
so the SFE can still be used to calculate equilibria in such markets. Hence, an advantage with
capacity payments is that producers will o¤er more competitively if the price cap is su¢ ciently
low so that it binds for the highest o¤ers (see gure 15), and the capacity payment will not
compensate strategic producers for the reduction in their mark-ups. This result in lower average
prices and reduces over-investment due to excessive entry.
However, a problem is that it might be protable for producers to withhold production
from the auction in order to increase LOLP and the capacity payments. This was a problem in
England and Wales (Newbery, 1995) and led to a change in the Pool rules so that plant would
not inuence the calculated LOLP until 8 days after withdrawal. Another potential problem
with capacity payments is that as with mark-ups they will result in welfare losses if they are
collected from consumers for every delivery period. An advantage with capacity payments, and
also to the issue of call options, is that it stabilizes risk-averse producers incomes. A major
problem with capacity payments is that even with detailed information, it is likely that there
will be large errors in the calculated capacity payments, because it is very di¢ cult for a system
operator to correctly estimate LOLP (Newbery, 1998b). Partly for this reason PJM and other
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American markets have instead imposed reserve requirements on distributors which results in
market based capacity payments to producers. However, it is not necessarily easier for regulators
to estimate welfare maximizing reserve requirements than correct values of LOLP.
A potential problem for investments is that producers may not trust market regulators to
keep a high price cap and high capacity payments during a period of extended electricity short-
ages, as it would lead to very high electricity prices. Although home consumers can contract to
reduce the adverse consequences of the resulting price spikes, there might be political pressure on
regulators to lower the price cap or capacity payments, in order to push down electricity prices
as illustrated in gure 15, even if such an irrational measure would exacerbate the shortage,
especially in interconnected markets, where neighbouring markets with electricity shortage need
to compete for reserve capacity (Stoft, 2002).13 Hence, even if the price cap is set to VOLL,
producers might under-invest due to the regulatory risk that the price cap might be lowered
in the future. As with granting independence to central banks, it should be possible to re-
duce this potential time-inconsistency problem by making regulators of electricity markets more
independent.
Entry and investments will be stimulated by high mark-ups. Mark-ups for production late in
the merit-order are to a large extent determined by the price cap and LOLP. Hence, for a given
price cap and LOLP, marginal investments in peaking power plants should be less dependent
on the number of rms in the market compared to investments in o¤-peak production. Hence,
compared to a competitive market with the same market capacity, one would expect more entry
with o¤-peak power plants into a non-competitive market, which may be true for incumbents
investments as well.
4.3 Restrictions on the o¤er curves
The SFE outlined in Section 2 is an equilibrium for any demand uncertainty. The equilibrium is
unique when no o¤er along the upper supply schedule is accepted or rejected with certainty. But
if the demand uncertainty is bounded or if producers neglect very unlikely outcomes then the
equilibrium o¤er curves may have sections that are either accepted or rejected with certainty.
These sections are only price-setting for out-of-equilibrium events. Hence, producers can choose
the shape of these sections without regard to the expected equilibrium prot and a wide-range
of SFE can be supported under these circumstances (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green and
Newbery, 1992). Figure 16 shows how the lower section of an o¤er curve, where o¤ers are
always inframarginal (accepted with certainty), can be chosen to discourage competitors from
13The highest price spike in the English Pool occurred when the French market needed to import power instead
of its normal export behaviour, and at the same time a British nuclear power station tripped.
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Figure 16: Infra-marginal parts of an o¤er curve to discourage deviations
undercutting the lowest realized equilibrium price, because in this case the output of the producer
will remain xed for such an out-of-equilibrium event. This is a costless threat that would support
a less-competitive static equilibrium than would have been possible with a wider support of the
demand uncertainty. In addition, sections that are only price-setting for out-of-equilibrium events
can be used as costless signals to coordinate collusion (Klemperer, 2004).
A larger demand variation for a given o¤er curve widens the range of bids that are price-
setting with a positive probability. This measure reduces the range of SFE that can be supported
and the opportunities for costless signaling. In the pre-2001 pool of England and Wales, each
producer had to stick to the same o¤er curve during the whole day. In the Australian market
producers are restricted to choose ten price levels per production unit, which they must maintain
during the whole day, although the quantities o¤ered at the chosen prices are allowed to di¤er in
each delivery period. It is clear that such restrictions on the o¤er curves can make bidding more
competitive in one-shot games. But welfare is reduced if o¤ers are too constrained, as this may
lead to ine¢ cient production if a units costs vary during the day.
Auction rules can also constrain the shape of the o¤er curves. The SFE model assumes that
o¤ers consist of smooth supply curves. However, in practice electricity auctions require o¤ers
to be stepped or piece-wise linear curves. For administrative reasons there are also quantity
multiples, price tick sizes, and restrictions in the number of steps per bidder (see Table 1).
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Kremer and Nyborg (2004b) show that a large quantity
multiple and small price tick-sizes will encourage bidders to undercut each other, as in a Bertrand
game, which will result in a competitive equilibrium with zero mark-ups for non-pivotal producers
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with constant marginal costs. But this mechanism does not work for demand outcomes where
producers are pivotal14 because he will nd it protable to deviate from such a competitive
outcome. Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) show that the combination of large quantity multiples
and small price tick-sizes kills any pure-strategy equilibrium if the demand variation is su¢ ciently
large and at least one producer is pivotal at the highest demand outcome. Instead, as with
the Bertrand-Edgeworth model (Edgeworth, 1925), there will be mixed-strategy equilibria with
randomized bidding.
Table 1: Constraints on the supply functions in various electricity markets.
Market Max steps Price range Price tick size Quantity multiple
Nord Pool spot 64 per bidder 0-5,000
NOK/MWh
0.1
NOK/MWh
0.1 MWh
ERCOT balancing 40 per bidder -$1,000/MWh-
$1,000/MWh
$0.01/MWh 0.01 MWh
PJM 10 per genset 0-$1,000/MWh $0.01/MWh 0.01 MWh
UK (NETA) 5 per genset -£ 9,999/MWh-
£ 9,999/MWh
£ 0.01/MWh 0.001 MWh
Spain Intra-day market 5 per genset Yearly cap on
revenues
e0.01/MWh 0.1 MWh
Analogously, Anderson and Xu (2004) show that strategic producers in the Australian mar-
ket design should randomise their choice of stated price levels. It is unclear whether the large
quantity multiples assumed in the von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) model might result in
lower average mark-ups for mixed-strategy equilibria, but it is clear that the market partici-
pants would bear the cost of uncertainty caused by the inherent price instability. Moreover,
randomized bidding will cause production ine¢ ciencies. For example, symmetric producers with
strictly increasing marginal costs do not cause any production ine¢ ciencies for a given market
output in a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, but they do in a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium. On the other hand an advantage with mixing is that it widens the range of bids
that are price-setting with a positive probability. This decreases the risk that out-of-equilibrium
bids are used as costless signals or costless threats. Newbery (1998a) conjectures that the mixing
may not be too severe if each producer is allowed to choose many steps in their o¤er curves.
Parisio and Bosco (2003) show that pure-strategy equilibria can occur also in markets with large
14A producer is pivotal if competitors do not have enough capacity to meet market demand in his absence.
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quantity multiples relative to the price tick size if there is su¢ cient uncertainty in competitors
cost functions.
Holmberg et al. (2008) show that if the market design instead has small quantity multiples
relative to the price tick size and if the market has lax or no restrictions on the number of steps,
then undercutting down to the marginal cost is avoided and the market has a pure-strategy
equilibrium that converges to the smooth SFE as the number of price levels increases, also for
pivotal producers. Hence, if market designers want to avoid inherent price instabilities, they can
choose large price tick sizes, small quantity multiples, and lax restrictions on the number of steps
per bidder. Under benecial circumstances, Anderson and Hu (2008a) show that pure-strategy
equilibria exist also for piece-wise linear supply functions, and that they converge to smooth SFE.
Electricity auctions with piece-wise linear o¤er curves are used in Nord Pool (Nordic countries)
and PowerNext (France). This seems to be the easiest way to avoid a market design with the
inherent price instability caused by mixed strategies.
Rationing of excess supply at the clearing price is often necessary in multi-unit auctions
and so market designs must specify how rationing will take place. This is normally by pro-rata
on-the-margin rationing (Kremer and Nyborg, 2004a) in which only the incremental supply at
the clearing price is rationed and the accepted share of each producers incremental supply at
this price is proportional to the size of this increment o¤ered. Holmberg et al. (2008) note
that this rationing rule has the advantage that prots in a one-shot game are maximised when
supra-marginal o¤ers (o¤ers that are never accepted in equilibrium) are o¤ered with a perfectly
elastic segment along the highest realised equilibrium price. This strategy maximizes the size of
a producers incremental supply and accepted output at the highest shock outcome. Hence, pro-
rata on-the-margin rationing will make it costly to use supra-marginal o¤ers for signalling and
threats in multi-unit auctions. This form of supra-marginal o¤ers is also benecial in supporting
the most competitive SFE consistent with producerscapacity constraints.
4.4 Pay-as-bid auctions
The pay-as-bid auction is used in most treasury auctions around the world, but it has so far
been less popular in electricity markets. One exception is England & Wales, which switched to
such a format in 2001 for the balancing mechanism (the only remaining auction marketas the
day-ahead market is e¤ectively an OTC market). Italy seems to become another exception, a
recent law dated January 2009 says that their day-ahead market should switch to a pay-as-bid
format.
If producers would o¤er the same curves in pay-as-bid auctions as they use in uniform-price
auctions, then average prices in electricity markets would be signicantly lower with the pay-as-
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Figure 17: Producer surplus in uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions.
bid format as illustrated in gure 17. However, as pointed out by Kahn et al. (2001), Wolfram
(1999) and others, this naïve assumption is not reasonable, as strategic producers will change
their optimal bidding strategies when the auction format changes.15 Moreover, theoretical and
empirical results applicable to treasury auctions show that rankings of the auctioneers revenue
are ambiguous for the two formats (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002). In this auction buyers have
common/a¢ liated uncertain values given by the value of the security in the secondary market.
Hence, these results should be applicable to day-ahead auctions in electricity markets, where
producersopportunity costs of selling in a later market are common/a¢ liated.
Electricity prices went down in Britain after their real-time market switched to a pay-as-bid
format. But Evans and Green (2005) use a SFE model to control for investments and market
concentration in Britain and they conclude that low electricity prices after the introduction of
pay-as-bid pricing in 2001 can be explained by added capacity as well as forced and voluntary
divestitures rather than the changed auction format. An experiment by Rassenti et al. (2003)
even suggests that average prices might be higher in pay-as-bid auctions, at least if demand is
certain.
Game-theoretic models of real-time markets with static strategies, however, have so far con-
cluded that short-run average prices are lower with the pay-as-bid format, at least if contracting
is neglected. Fabra et al. (2006) came to this conclusion using an auction model, where producers
choose one price for all of their capacity, as did Son et al. (2004) with a similar model. Holmberg
(2009b) reaches similar conclusions for an SFE model. His results suggest that switching from a
uniform-price to a pay-as-bid format will be most benecial for the auctioneer/consumers when
the risk of power shortage is neither extremely small nor extremely large and when competition
15 Indeed, in single object auctions the Revenue Equivalence theorem implies that payments to producers will
be the same under either format. See e.g. Klemperer (2004).
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is imperfect without being extremely bad. Under perfect competition producersexpected prots
are the same regardless of the auction format. Wang and Zender (2002) use a model of strategic
bidding, which is essentially a SFE model, to compare auction formats in treasury auctions.
They also conclude that the auctioneer would prefer the pay-as-bid format.
These theoretical results were all derived for oligopoly markets with inelastic demand and a
xed price cap. Elastic demand in pay-as-bid auctions creates some di¢ culties. As with Bertrand
models (Maskin, 1986), the question is how much of the excess demand at lower o¤ered prices
will remain at higher prices. Federico and Rahman (2003) assume that demand depends on the
highest accepted o¤er in the market though much of the demand is met at lower prices, because of
the pay-as-bid mechanism. The corresponding assumption in Bertrand models is called parallel
rationing (Maskin, 1986), which is equivalent to the assertion that demand does not depend on
income (Levitan and Shubik, 1972). The result of Federico and Rahmans (2003) assumption is
that the non-strategic demand side of their model is the same in the pay-as-bid and uniform-price
format, which simplies their analysis. Using an SFE model, Federico and Rahman (2003) show
that consumer surplus is larger in pay-as-bid auctions compared to uniform-price auctions for
both monopolistic and perfectly competitive producers. However, output and total welfare are
sometimes lower in the pay-as-bid format and these models do not discuss long-run equilibrium
in which capacity is endogenous.
Under suitable conditions there will be a pure strategy NE in pay-as-bid auctions, where
each producer chooses a smooth optimal supply curve given the properties of its residual demand.
But compared with uniform-price auctions, it is normally harder to derive an SFE for pay-as-bid
auctions. Ex post it is always optimal to o¤er all accepted bids at the same price, the marginal
bid. Hence, ex post optimality for a range of demand shocks in a pay-as-bid auction would
require horizontal o¤ers. As with the Bertrand NE, pure-strategy equilibria with horizontal
o¤ers are possible if capacity constraints are non-binding and marginal costs are constant (Wang
and Zender, 2002). But this is an exception, typically equilibrium o¤ers to the pay-as-bid auction
are not ex post optimal. Hence, as with the generalisations of the SFE model discussed in Section
2.1, optimal o¤ers will normally depend on the probability distribution of the demand shock. The
pay-as-bid format also implies that the o¤er price of one unit does not inuence the prot from
the producers other units, as long as the units are o¤ered in merit-order. Hence, the expected
prot from each unit can be optimized independently. Rather than choosing the o¤er curve
such that the prot is maximized for each shock outcome, which is the case in the uniform-price
format, producers in the pay-as-bid format choose an o¤er curve so that the expected prot from
each production unit is maximized (given the properties of the residual demand).
Let F (") be the probability distribution of the demand shock and f(") the density function
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of this shock. Assume that a unit q of the producer is o¤ered at the price p and that this o¤er
is marginal for the shock outcome ". Then the optimal o¤er of a production unit is given by
the following relation (Holmberg, 2009b, Anderson et al., 2009):

p  C 0 (q) f (")"  [1  F (")] "jD0res (p)j| {z }
p
= 0: (4)
The rst term is the expected marginal gain from the unit q if its o¤er is lowered, so that the
range of demand shocks for which the o¤er is accepted increases from " to " + ". Hence,
the probability that the bid of unit q is accepted increases by f(")", which considering the
units mark-up, gives the expected marginal gain (p   C0(q))f(")": The second term is the
loss associated with increased sales. To achieve this the o¤er price is decreased by the amount
p = "jD0res(p)j , which results in the marginal loss [1  F ("
)] "jD0res(p)j ; where 1   F ("
) is the
probability that the o¤er of unit q is accepted. The optimal o¤er price p is determined by the
requirement that the marginal gain and marginal loss exactly balance each other. Moreover, for
a prot maximum, we have the necessary second-order condition that the marginal loss must
increase faster with respect to " compared to the marginal gain. In contrast to the second-order
condition for uniform-price auctions, this is quite a restrictive condition. It is straightforward
to show by means of (4) that this will require the hazard rate of the demand shock f(")1 F (") to
be decreasing with respect to " at points where the marginal cost is locally constant (Holmberg,
2009b, Anderson et al., 2009). This restriction on the probability distribution rules out many
demand shock distributions that one would encounter in practice, including the normal distribu-
tion. An exception, where pure-strategy SFE exists also for locally constant marginal costs is the
Pareto distribution of the second-kind, which Holmberg (2009b) uses in his calculations. Pure-
strategy SFE exists for a broader class of demand distributions if marginal costs are increasing
and mark-ups are su¢ ciently low.
In uniform-price auctions it is optimal to o¤er the rst unit at marginal cost, also for strategic
producers (see gure 4 ). In pay-as-bid auctions such bidding would result in zero prots from
the rst unit and they are therefore generally o¤ered with a mark-up. Hence, for low demand
outcomes prices are generally higher in pay-as-bid auctions. If demand is su¢ ciently inelastic
so that the highest o¤er is determined by the price cap, then the highest o¤er in both auction
formats will be equal to the price cap. In uniform-price auctions the highest o¤er is price-setting
for the whole market, so all producers get this price. In pay-as-bid auctions on the other hand,
the average of the price paid to accepted o¤ers (the system buy price) is generally lower than the
highest o¤er. Hence, for high demand outcomes, the system buy price is lower than in uniform-
price auctions. In summary, the price variation (the di¤erence between the lowest and highest
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Figure 18: Mixed-strategy NE for high and medium mark-ups in pay-as-bid auctions but a pure-
strategy NE for low mark-ups.
system buy price) is lower in pay-as-bid auctions when there is a pure-strategy equilibrium. This
has also been conrmed in the experiments by Rassenti et al. (2003).
There is, however, a considerable risk that the second-order condition is not satised in
balancing markets. Garcia and Kirschen (2006) nd that system imbalances in Britain are ap-
proximately normally distributed. Given the central limit theorem, this is not surprising as the
system imbalance results from a large number of actions by di¤erent market participants acting
independently. Second, marginal electricity production costs are roughly stepped, i.e. approxi-
mately locally constant. Hence, one can expect that o¤er curves submitted to electricity auctions
with pay-as-bid formats are at least partly randomized. Genc (2009) shows that mixtures over
horizontal o¤ers occur in discriminatory divisible-good auctions for cases with constant mar-
ginal costs and uniformly distributed demand (see left graph of gure 18). His equilibrium is
unchanged if producers are restricted to choose one price for their whole capacity as in the auc-
tion model by Fabra et al. (2006). These strategic mixtures are essentially Bertrand-Edgeworth
equilibria (Edgeworth, 1925), but with uncertain demand. Fabra et al.s (2006) comparison with
mixed-strategy equilibria in uniform-price auctions indicates that the auctioneer prefers the pay-
as-bid format also when producers use mixed strategies. Anderson et al. (2009) generalize the
results by Genc (2009) by considering mixtures for increasing marginal costs. In this case, mixed
strategy equilibria will cause production ine¢ ciencies. With increasing marginal costs and a
su¢ ciently low price cap there will be new types of mixed strategy equilibria where some of the
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o¤er curves have strictly increasing parts (see middle graph of gure 18).
As a nal remark on the game-theoretic analysis we must caution that possible lower short-
run prices in the pay-as-bid auction may not be true in a long-run equilibrium in which investors
need to earn a normal return on their investment; they may under-invest in market designs with
discriminatory pricing, leading to higher long-run average prices.
An advantage with pay-as-bid auctions compared to uniform-price auctions is that all infra-
marginal bids are price-setting. Hence, the risk that out of equilibrium bids are used as costless
signals or costless threats is lower in pay-as-bid auctions compared to uniform-price auctions
(Klemperer, 2004). Fabra (2003) and Klemperer (2004) show that the risk for tacit collusion is
lower in pay-as-bid auctions compared to uniform-price auctions.
The pay-as-bid format is disadvantageous for must-run plants that have to bid su¢ ciently
low that their bids are surely accepted. But this is less of a problem if they can sell most of
their production in forward markets or if the System Operator invites longer-term tenders for
such plant. To make the design of real-time markets more favourable to must-run plants one
can also allow for non-competitive o¤ers (Klemperer, 2004). These o¤ers are always accepted
and they are paid the system buy price. Non-competitive bids are often allowed in treasury
auctions. Similar solutions seem sensible for small electricity producers, because producers need
good information of the properties of the residual demand to bid intelligently (Klemperer, 2004).
Otherwise pay-as-bid auctions might discourage potential bidders who have only small amounts
to trade and for whom the cost of obtaining market information might not be worth paying. For
the same reason, a major concern is that the pay-as-bid format might deter potential entrants.
One issue with pay-as-bid auctions is that they have multiple prices, so there is no obvious
strike price that can be used to clear nancial contracts. Before 1991 the electricity Pool of
England and Wales acted as both a day-ahead market and balancing market with a well-dened
strike price on which contracts-for-di¤erences could be written. With the abolition of this gross
pool (into which all generators had to o¤er) under the New Electricity Trading Arrangements,
the day-ahead market became a small (2-3%) residual market and the balancing mechanism
was separated to become a real-time market, operated as a pay-as-bid auction with no single
strike price. The extra risk created by the balancing mechanism arguably encouraged generators
and supply businesses to vertically integrate to reduce wholesale and balancing risks, which
considerably reduced liquidity in forward markets. According to Ofgem (2009) liquidity is only
one-third that in Germany and the Nordic countries. Another concern with the multiple prices
associated with pay-as-bid auctions is that they may cause problems for the system operator when
calculating optimal dispatches in a transmission-constrained system with locational pricing. In
such a system it will also become less obvious how a strike price should be calculated for each
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node or price zone. Even if the real-time market has a pay-as-bid format, it is still possible to
trade day-ahead in a uniform-price auction, provided there is adequate liquidity, and in that
case it might still be possible for a uniform-price day-ahead market to provide strike prices for
nancial contracts (such as contracts-for-di¤erences). Proponents of nodal pricing for Britain
(which are seen as increasingly necessary to handle large intermittent wind generation) also
argue that a return to central dispatch and a gross pool would be needed to create the necessary
pricing environment for liquid hedging contracts to re-emerge.
5 Conclusions
The supply function model describes optimal bidding in wholesale electricity auctions where
demand varies and/or is uncertain. It is a static model, in that producers choose their o¤ers
curves to maximize prots at each moment (hour or half-hour) given their residual demand
at that moment, without regard to bidding in future periods. Empirical studies of bidding in
electricity markets by and large support this model and its underlying assumptions, i.e. ex-post
(after uncertainties have been realised) producers maximize their prots for each period given
their smoothed residual demand curve. But there are exceptions. For example, Sweeting (2007)
shows that producers coordinated to o¤er curves higher than the SFE model would have predicted
during a period when producers were divesting plants, in e¤ect tacitly colluding to keep prices
higher and thus maintain the appearance of a more protable market, leading to higher sales
values for their divested plant. After divestiture, margins rapidly collapsed (Newbery, 2005).
This paper provides new results that highlight how short-run welfare losses depend on the
number of rms in the market and their asymmetry. We show that market integration reduces
mark-ups when demand shocks in the integrated markets are not perfectly correlated or when
di¤erent producers operate on the integrated markets. Mark-ups depend very much on the
elasticity of the demand, but we show that social welfare relative to prots is less sensitive to
this elasticity. In this case it is mainly the load factor and the number of producers that matters.
Without forward contracts, 5-10 symmetric producers are needed to keep the average welfare loss
relative to the average industry prot below 1%. This corresponds to a market concentration
index (HHI) of 1000-2000. With asymmetric rms, lower market concentration indices are needed
to keep relative average welfare losses below 1% due to the production ine¢ ciencies caused by
asymmetric mark-ups. These ine¢ ciencies increase with the asymmetry in the market. More
research is needed to analyse long-run welfare losses resulting from ine¢ cient investments.
Forward contracting reduces strategic producersmark-up incentives. If producers sell half
their expected output in the forward market, relative welfare losses decrease by a factor 4-
10. This is of the same order of magnitude as if the number of producers would have been
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doubled. The question is what incentives producers have to sell in the forward market when
this decreases their market-power. Sometimes forward sales are forced upon large producers.
For example, competition authorities can order them to sell parts of their capacity in virtual
power plant auctions. Introducing penalty charges for deviations from contracted power give
consumers incentives to buy their expected demand in the day-ahead and other forward markets.
Producers forward sales are also driven by their risk aversion and by arbitrage opportunities.
As retailers have very thin margins they tend to be more risk-averse, which pushes up forward
prices, encouraging producers to o¤er forward sales.
Forward sales can also be driven by strategic contracting, i.e. the producer wants to increase
its market-share at competitors expense. This mechanism has pro-competitive e¤ects when
competitors are marginal buyers in the forward market. Results are less robust when consumers
are marginal buyers in the forward market. A market designer can keep this latter e¤ect weak by
introducing penalty charges for deviations from contracted power and by not disclosing producers
forward positions to the market.
Requiring individual o¤er curves to be disclosed to regulators makes it straightforward to
monitor potential mark-ups and market manipulation. This is a great advantage especially for
hydro-dominated markets, which are very complicated to monitor, as production decisions are
determined by a prognosis of future inows to the reservoirs and future electricity prices. Public
disclosure should be delayed, perhaps by a year, so that it does not facilitate collusion. To reduce
signalling opportunities, it may also be benecial to only disclose parts of the o¤er curves around
the clearing point, which is enough to monitor potential mark-ups.
Combining capacity payments with a low price cap reduces the risk for investors and makes
bidding more competitive. However, one has to make sure that this does not provide incentives
to withhold power from the auction, and it is di¢ cult to calculate the loss of load probability
accurately, which capacity payments are based on. Moreover, capacity payments result in welfare
losses if they are collected from consumers every delivery period. If one wants to minimize welfare
losses it makes more sense to collect the compensation for investorsxed costs when the capacity
constraint binds, which is the case in perfectly competitive markets without capacity payments
and a high price cap.
Restrictions on the o¤er curves and long-lived o¤ers decrease the possibilities for tacit col-
lusion, but such restrictions may cause production ine¢ ciencies. Large quantity multiples are
useful to ensure competitive bidding when no producer is pivotal, but with pivotal producers,
such a design will cause inherent price instabilities due to randomized bidding. These cause
production ine¢ ciencies and unnecessary uncertainty for market participants.
For given production capacities theoretical results indicate that average electricity prices
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are lower if real-time markets use the pay-as-bid format instead of the uniform-price format.
However, empirically the e¤ect is not signicant and for results applicable to day-ahead markets
both empirical and theoretical comparisons of the two formats are ambiguous. One advantage
with the pay-as-bid auction is that the risk for collusion is smaller, at least in theory. On
the other hand, there is a considerable risk that pay-as-bid clearing results in inherent price
instabilities. Moreover, detailed market prognoses are required to bid in pay-as-bid auctions,
which disadvantages small producers, deters entry and in any case may have no benecial long-
run e¤ect once investment incentives are considered.
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Appendix
Consider N symmetric producers with constant marginal costs c and linear demandD(p) = a bp,
so that D0 =  b. The relation in (1) can be written as follows:
qi   (N   1) q0i (p  c) = b (p  c) : (5)
Multiply both sides by the integrating factor  (p c)
 1=(N 1)
(N 1)(p c) :
 qi (p  c) 1=(N 1)
(N   1) (p  c) + q
0
i (p  c) 1=(N 1) =
 b (p  c) 1=(N 1)
(N   1) :
Noting that
d
dp
h
qi (p  c) 1=(N 1)
i
=
 b (p  c) 1=(N 1)
(N   1) ;
integrate both sides to give
qi (p  c) 1=(N 1) = A 
Z
b (p  c) 1=(N 1)
(N   1) dp =A 
b
(N   2) (p  c)
(N 2)=(N 1) :
Thus
qi = A (p  c)1=(N 1)   b
(N   2) (p  c) ; (6)
and
q0i =
A (p  c)(2 N)=(N 1)
N   1  
b
(N   2) :
Let p be the price where the capacity constraint starts to bind. To ensure smooth residual
demand for all producers, o¤ers must be vertical at this point (see gure 5), i.e. q0i (p) = 0:
Hence,
q0i (p) =
A (p  c)(2 N)=(N 1)
N   1  
b
(N   2) = 0;
which implies that
A =
(N   1) b (p  c)(N 2)=(N 1)
(N   2) :
Accordingly, (6) can be written as follows:
qi =
b (p  c)
(N   2)
 
(N   1)

p  c
p  c
(N 2)=(N 1)
  1
!
:
Let q be the symmetric capacity constraint. But from (5) q = b (p  c). Hence, (6) can be written
as:
qi =
b (p  c)
(N   2)
 
(N   1)

q
(p  c) b
(N 2)=(N 1)
  1
!
: (7)
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Now dene the load factor x = qi=q and the elasticity at the marginal cost  = cbNq , both of
which are dimension-less numbers Thus (7) can be simplied to:
x

=
N (p  c)
(N   2) c
 
(N   1)

1
N
c
p  c
(N 2)=(N 1)
  1
!
: (8)
The next step is to derive a relation between the mark-up and the deadweight loss. In the
case when demand is linear, this loss, illustrated in gure 6, can be calculated from
W =
(p  c)2 b
2
:
The total (short-run) industry prot is  = (p   c)Nqi, so the ratio of deadweight loss to the
industry prot ! is
W

 ! = b(p  c)
2
2(p  c)Nqi =
 (p  c)
2xc
=) p  c
c
=
2x!

:
Then equations simplify as (8) becomes
x

=
2Nx!
(N   2) 
 
(N   1)

1
N

2x!
(N 2)=(N 1)
  1
!
1 =
2N!
(N   2)
 
(N   1)

1
2Nx!
(N 2)=(N 1)
  1
!
;
2N!=xN 2

N(1 + 2!)  2
(N   1)
N 1
; (9)
x = 2N(N   1)N 1 !
(N(1 + 2!)  2)N 1 : (10)
Proof that increasing N reduces the price-cost margin
Dene two new variables, y and , where
y  N (p  c)
c
=
b (p  c)
q
=
p  c
p  c ; so y 2 [0; 1] : (11)
(The second equality follows from the denition of .) Dene
  (N   1)
(N   2) (12)
and insert (11) and (12) into (8) to give:
x = yy 1=  y
N   2 = y
1 1=  y
N   2 :
This is an identity that is valid for any number of symmetric rms, N . Di¤erentiate both sides
of the equality with respect to N , holding the load factor x constant:
0 = 0y1 1=+(1  1=)y0y 1=+ 
0
2
ln (y)y1 1=  y
0
N   2 +
y
(N   2)2 :
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We have from (11) and (12) that y0 = (p c)c +
Np0
c and 
0 = 1(N 2)   (N 1)(N 2)2 =
 1
(N 2)2 : Hence,
0 =
 y1 1=
(N   2)2+(  1)

 (p  c)
c
+
Np0
c

y 1= (13)
  ln (y) y
1 1=
 (N   2)2  
 (p  c)
c (N   2)  
Np0
c (N   2) +
y
(N   2)2 :
From (12)   1 = 1N 2 ; and dening
Y  y
 1=
N   2  
 (p  c)
cy
y 1= +
ln (y) y 1=
 (N   2) +
 (p  c)
cy
  1
N   2
=
y 1=
N   2  
y 1=
N
+
ln (y) y 1=
N   1 +
1
N
  1
N   2 : (14)
equation (13) can be written
yY
N   2 =
Np0
c (N   2)

y 1= 1

: (15)
It now remains to determine the sign of Y . Di¤erentiate (14)
dY
dy
=   y
 1 1=
 (N   2) +
y 1 1=
N
+
y 1 1=
N   1  
y 1 1= ln y
 (N   1)
= y 1 1=

  1
N   1 +
1
N
+
1
N   1  
ln y
 (N   1)

= y 1 1=

1
N
  ln y
 (N   1)

> 0;
because y 2 [0; 1] : Hence Y is largest when y = 1 and we can conclude from (14) that Y  0;
because Y = 0 if y = 1: We also realise that
 
y 1= 1  0; because y 2 [0; 1] : Thus it follows
from (15) that p0 = dpdN  0 and we have established that mark-ups decrease when the number
of rms increase (everything else equal).
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